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ABSTRACT
The RUA Computer Security Program is based on the fundamental
premise that it is not possible to have a risk-free data
processing operation. Risks, therefore, gust be managed. This
report presents guidance to NASA computer security officials for
developing risk management plans. An overview of ADP security
risk management provides a discussion of the six components of
the risk management process: (1) risk analysis, (2) risk
reduction analysis, (3) management decisions. (4) risk reduction
action plans, (S) implementat t.on and maintenance of plans, and
(6) review and audit of plans.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Office of Mansgement and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71,
Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, dated 27 July 1978, requires each
agency to develop and implement a computer security program.
This document provides guidance for developing risk management
plans which are one aspect of the NASA Computer Security
Program. The development, implementation, and maintenance of
risk management plans follow the performance of a Data
Processing Installation (DPI) risk analysis or a sensitive
application evaluation and certification process. Risk
management planning is performed to assure that ADP security
risks are prudently managed since it is not possible to have a
risk-free data processing environment.
NASA is well into the computer security program development and
Implementation process in compliance with OMB Circular A-71, TM
No. 1. NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 2410.7, "Assuring
Security and Integrity of NASA Data Processing" has been
Issued; Center-level management instructions on computer
security have been issued; Computer Security Officials (CSOs)
at the Center, DPI and applications levels have been appointed;
and computer security guidelines have been published to address
the performance of risk analysis, definition of security
requirements for applications software, evaluation/
certification of existing applications software, ADP
contingency planning and computer security training. Also, a
number of DPI risk analyses and application certifications have
been accomplished.
One of the next st do in the implementation of the NASA
Computer Security 'rogran is to develop guidance on managing
the security riskb associcted with their data processing
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Installations and applications systems. The guidance provided
herein may be modified by the NASA Centers, individual NASA
DPI*, or, with NASA approval, by the NASA contractors who
develop risk management plans for NASA organizations. The
guidance and risk management process may also be wodifed to
suit the needs of a DPI or an application commensurate with the
nature and degree of identified risk.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide NASA Center, DPI,
and Sensitive Application CSOa with guidance on the
preparation, implementation and maintenance of risk management
plans (Mips). These plans must be adequate to meet federal and
agency requirements and provide a systematic and flexible
approach to managing computer security risks. This document
addresses the risk management planning which should be
accomplished at the data processing installation, application
software, and Center levels.
1.2 Scope
The guidelines Presented in this document provide a systematic
process to assure that the security-risks reported to NASA
management are acted upon in an (orderly and timely fashion.
Implementation of controls should be accomplished according to
a zohesive plan approved by top management. The guidance is
applicable to the management of security risks that have been
Identified during a risk analysis performed at a data
processing installatton or during the evaluation/certification
of a sensitive application.
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1.3 Key Action Items in R16k Management Planning
Computer ssc •.trity officials, in their role as rick managers or
risk management planners, must accomplish a series of actions
to assure that DPI and application rink management plans .re
both comprehensive and usable. Lack of proper planning my
result in the implementation of ineffective controls, improper
Implementation of controls, or a plan that is not responsive to
changes in mission, organization, technology, and personnel.
The action items that should be accomplished by risk management
plan developers, implementers, and maintainers are:
1. Define the Risk Environment .* Review and document
current equipment and facility configurations; identify
sensitive and critical applications; and understand the
data processing operating environment.
2. Define the Categories of Risk.* The threits that can
adversely impact a DPI or an application should be
Identified and documented.
3. Evaluate Occurrence of Risks .* Each documented risk
should be evaluated with respect to Its likelihood of
occurrence. The rationale for the likelihood should
also be documented for future reference,.
4. Assesertent of Risk Occurrence Im^act .* Assess and
document the Laract on the DPI or application for each
risk, should it materialize.
S. Document Risk Reduction Decisicne. The decisions made
by management following a DPI risk analysis or an
application evaluation should be documented. The
controls selected for implementation, budgetary
limitations, and the milestones set by management
should be included in the documentation.
6. Develop Risk Reduction Action Plan. The risk reduction
action plan details the specificontrols as action
*The first four action items collecti 3ely comprise a risk analysis
or evaluation/certification activity.
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Items to be implemented. it also details the schedule
for internal design development, installation, and/or
procurement. The plan also establishes responsibility
for the accomplishment of each action item.
7. Implement the Controls. Implementation will involve
Integration of new revised controls into existing
processes. Personnel should be briefed or trained in 	 i
the operation of new controls. The rationale and
3	 benefits to be derived from implementation should also
be explained.
8. Develop Risk Management Plan Maintenance Procedures.
Changes in technology, organizations, and indivisuals
will probably cause changes to be made in the security
requirements of the DPI and the applications.
Maintenance procedures should be developed to ensure
that the risk management plan remains a dynamic sad
viable management too!.
9. Review and Audit. The risk management plan must be
reviewed periodically to determine if action items are
being accomplished in accordance with the plan.
Changes in facilities, equipment; organization, or
personnel may require modification to the risk
management plan. Changes may also indicate an update of
the last risk analysis and application evaluation
should be considered.
1.4 Overview of the Report
Section 2 provides an overview of risk management concepts and
the risk management planning process. Section 3 presents a
discussion of the steps to be accomplished in developing DPI,
application and Cen ter risk management plans. Section 4
addresses the area of risk manab:^ment plan maintenance.
e
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2. OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGENUT
NASA Handbook (MM) 2410. 1, Computer Resources !Management,
Appendix J. states:
. the NASA Computer Security program is based an the
fund ameutal praise that it is not possible to have a
risk-free date processing environment. Risks,
therefore, v ..c be managed. They lust be
appropriate:y defined, categorised as to likelihood of
occurrence, and assessed as to the resultant
consequences if they occur. Actions must then be
taken to allocate resources to UIL 4 -Ize risks in a
manner that provides the best overall security.
Risk management is a comprehensive concept :or defining and
analyzing the threats of which we are aware and assisting
management in optimizing the amount of security return on the
Investment dollar. The risk management process attempts to
answer the following questions:
s What is at risk and what needs to be done?
e What security controls are available to reduce the risks?
e What security controls will provide the best return on
Investment?
e Who is responsible for implementation?
e How will controls be implemented and over what time
frame?
e How effective are the controls once they are installed?
The ADP security risk management process consists of six major
phases:
1. Risk Analysis
2. Risk Reduction Analysis
-1
P: "
I
(
). Management Decision
6. Development of Risk Reduction Action Plains
S. Implementatios and Maintenance of Controls
6. Review and Audit
The ADP security risk management process provides for
progressive iteration since the risk en iromment is subject to
change. Fl&mre 2-1 depicts the process. the questions which
are answered in each phase. and the iterative nature of the
process. The ADP security risk managemest process is based on
the fundamental risk management concepts and definitions.
2.1 Risk Management Concepts
In 'An Anatomy of Risk.' hiilliam D. Rowe introduces the concept
of risk with the following sWenent:
The only certainty 12 life is death; -certainty lies
In when _ad how death occurs, and whe..aer it is final.
Man strives to delay its onset and extend the quality
of life in the interim. Threats to these objectives
Involve risks, some natural, some aa=-made. some beyond
our control, and some controllable.
Rowe further states:
Everyone is constantly subjected to an array of risks,
both as an individual and as a member of various
societal groups. Generally thcae risks are accepted
qualitatively, even questioned and deliberate: in this
scanner, rather than analysed quantitatively. As a
rule, risks are quantitatively assessed only in
_	 classic gambling games (e.g., playing the odds at
craps), in business and insurance decisions. and in
some governmental regulatory actions.
2-2
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FIGURE 2-1
`	 THE ADP SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROCES4.
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In the NASA AtP environment, quantifying risks is one of the
necessary activities in determining which threats should be
controlled.
2.1.1 Risk Definitions
Allen Willet in 'The Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance"
defines risk as 'the objective uncertainty regarding the
occurrence of an undesirable event." Prank Knight in "Risk.
Uncertainty and Profit" defines risk as 'measurable
uncertainty.' Derenburg, Eilers, Malone. and Zelten in 'Risk and
Insurance' define risk as "uncertainty of loss." All of these
definitions involve some aspect of uncertainty.
Rove states, "Uncertainty exists in the absence of information
about past, present or future events, values. or conditions ...
the basis of uncertainty to the absence of information about parts
of a system under consideration." In the data processing
environment, the process employed to reduce uncertainty is risk
analysis.
2.2 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis attempts to an gwer the question, "What is at risk?"
TIPS Pub 65, "Guidelines for Automatic Data Processing Risk
Analysis," defines APP security risk analysis as follows:
The aim of risk analysis is to help ADP management
strike an economic balance between the impact of risks
and the cost of protective measures. It serves to
point out the risks which exist;
	 . An analysis
shows the current security posture of ADP processing in
an organization; it then assembles the basic facts
necessary for the selection of adequate, cost effective
safeguards.
2-5
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A quantitative statement of risk is the result of two
considerations: (1) the damage that can result from an
unfavorable event, and (2) the likelihood that such an event
will occur.
An analysis of risk involves the following procedures:
• Identify the scope of the risk environment and determine
what is at risk.
e Identify the -flaws in the environment that sight permit
the threats to materialize.
i
e Estimate the likelihood that the threats will occur.
e State the cost of loss that could be incurred if the
threats to the risk environment were to materialise.
It should be understood that risk analysis, or the reduction of
uncertainty, does not of itself reduce risk. Using the
Information gained from the risk analysis, a further awulysis
can be performed to determine what measures can be taken to
reduce the identified risks and potential losses.
2.3 Risk Reduction Analysis
Risk reduction analysis can be viewed as an analytical process
that attempts to answer the following questions: what controls
are available to reduce risks, and which controls will provide
the best security return on investment? The risk reduction
analysis determines the cost of potential contro.'.s including
both the implementation and maintenance costs. A cost-benefit
analysis should be conducted to estimate the reduction in risk
if the safeguards were to be applied. The final step in the
risk reduction analysis is to recommend a set of controls to
i
i
l
I	
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management. The recommendations should include a return oz
Investment calculation which provides a ratio of the expected
loss reduction to the anntusl control cost.
2.4 Management Decisions
The choice and use of methods of treating risks are management
decisions. In the government environment, management has four
options for dealing with known risks:
1. Option 1 - Eliminate the Risk. The objective under
this option is to eliminate vulnerabilities or
potential vulnerabilities as early as possible in the
system life cycle. At best this takes place early in
the design and development of a system.
2. Option 2 - Loss Prevention. Controls should be
Implemented to prevent loss as far as possible when
risks cannot be eliminated due to technological or
operational reasons.
3. Option 3 - Lose Limitation. Loss limitation should be
considered when prevention is not possible. The task
of loss limitation is to limit the extent of loss to an
acceptable level.
4. Option 4 - Accept the Risk. Management may decide to
accept the risk and the consequences when the cost of
loss is not significant, the cost to prevent or limit
loss exceeds the potential loss, or the probability of
loss is judged to be sufficiently small.
After the risk analysis and risk reduction analysis results are
presented to management, decisions are made regarding the
specific controls to be implemented. While the risk analysis
team makes recommendations based on security need and return on
investment, management should make the final selection based on
Its broader view of organizational mission, goals, and
objectives. Management must designate priorities for the
Implementation of controls in consideration of other
2-1
requirements for staff and budgetary resources, planned
upgrades or replacement of equipment. planned major changes to
existing systems and the developmental activities for new or
replacement systems. Management should also make the initial
determination regarding which organisational elements and/or
personnel will be responsible for the implementation of
controls and provide direction and guidance on the schedule for
Implementing those controls. In cases where the coordination
or approval of other organisational and/or management personnel
Is required. management should assure that such coordination or
approval is obtained. All decisions made by management
concerning the risk analysis results should be d*cemented for
use by the risk management plan developers.
2.5 Development of Risk Reduction Action Plans
After management has determined which security controls will be
Implemented, the tasks leading to impleaentation must be
	
1
accomplished. The risk reduction action plans must identify 	 j
what controls are to be implemented, the systems and processes
affected, the persons responsible, and the schedule for
Implementation. Depending on the type of control to be
implemented, procurement activities may have to be initiated or
Internal design and development activities planned. Regardless
of whether control, are procured free outside sources or
developed internally. resources (personnel and money) will have
to be obtained and allocated. In either case. the risk
reduction action plan is the tool that will assure that
security controls are implemented in a systematic manner.
2-8
2.6 Implementation and Maintenance of Controls
Implementation of security controls will necessitate some
change in processes, functions, or responsibilities.
Therefore, each person who is affected by any changes due to
the implementation of controls mus: be convinced that:
(1) there is a problem, (7) they can do something about it, and
(3) it is advantageous to do so. Prior to implementing new
controls, any changes in operations should be coordinated with
affected personnel and additional training may also be
required. Where possible, controls should be thoroughly tested
to assure that they are operationally and technically sound.
Once installed, controls should be maintained in accordance
with the risk rpduction action plans. When the risk
environment changes, the maintenance process must be flexible
enough to handle such changes.
2.7 Review and Audit
There should be a reasonable balance between the risk
environment and the protection against such risks. Changes in
operational processes, technology, and types of applications
may result in materialisation of neV or different risks. Some
risks may become less significant. Periodic reviews of
security controls should be conducted to alert sandgement to
Ineffective. non-functioning, or unneeded controls as well as
Indications of where new risks exist. Depending on the nature
and magnitude of changes, an update to the previous risk
analysis may be indicated.
Previous NASA guidance provided methodologier- for conducting
and documenting risk analysis and evaluating/certifying
existing applications. The remainder of this document will
2-9
provide guidance on an approach for assuring that the needed
controls identified in risk analysis and application
evaluation/certification are successfully implemented and
maintained.
t
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3. RISK MA::1:M M UT PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Appendix J, NH3 2410.1, states that sound management of risks
demands documentation in the form of a risk management plan
(RMP). the development of an RMP follows the conduct of a DPI
risk analysis and/or a sensitive application evaluation/
certification. An RMP includes a description of the risk
environment, categorisation of the risks to the risk
environment, an evaluation cf risk occurrence, the impact on
the risk environment should the risks materialise, the degree
to which risks can be controlled, and the actions which have
been or are being taken to reduce risks. The development of an
RMP will draw heavily upon the information that was collected
or generated during the risk analysis or sensitive application
evaluation. Separate guidance is provided for DPI and
sensitive applications because separate methodologies are used
within NASA to evaluate the risks to data processing
Installations and sensitive applications.
3.1 Preliminary Planning
As indicated previously, the guidance presented herein presumes
that a risk analysis has been conducted at a data processing
Installation and/or an evaluation has been performed on an
existing sensitive application. Although no reference is
specifically made to new applications, it should be noted that
(1) risk management plans should be developed for such
applications and, (2) the development process described herein
Is sufficiently generic so that it can be employed by personnel
developing RMP's for new applications. In addition to having
accomplished a DPI r-'sk analysis, the following guidance
assumes that the risk analysis results have been presented to
3-1
management and that management has mad .N decisions regarding
which risks will be accepted without additional controls being
applied and which risks will be eliminated or reduced through
the implementation of controls. Management decisions should
include a projected time frame for implementation and
designation of responsibilities for implementation. In the
case of applications, management decisions and implementation
guidance should be included in or be an outcome of the
certification process. Figure 3-1 depicts the inter-
relationships between the major activities of a DPI risk
analysis, an application evaluation certification, and the risk
management plan development process.
The analysis of assets and applications from the risk analysis
provides the input for the risk environment section of the DPI
RMP. The data for the sensitive application kMP should be
found in the application sensitivity determination, security
requirements review, and security specifications review portion
of the application evaluation report. The threat and
vulnerability analysis from the DPI risk analyais and the
application system vulnerability analysis and threat scenario
analysis provides the input to the risk categorization and risk
occurrence evaluation se^.-tions of an RMP. The annual, loss-
exposure phase of the risk analysis and the application Chreat
scenario analysis provides the input for the risk occur%-ence
Impact portion of an RMP. The information required as input to
the risk-reductf .on decision portion of the RMP are the risk
analysis management decisions and the certification decisions
concerning which controls will be implemented.
The risk-reduction acticn plans will Drimarily be based upon the
management and certification decisions following a DPI risk
analysis or an application evaluation/certification respectively.
I
i
I
E
3-2
ac^
N
10
C
YN
s
1W
C@^
G7
C
p^	 QCca	 ..
E
C
O cO
ar c	"vatt¢Q	 L[¢ o
a
^	 ^ H
N -^ T
^	
VmQ
o ^
C N	 O C
U O 1
	 d vl
Ec -i►ti	
.G
0L)
FIGURE 3-1
INTERRELATION OF DPi RISK ANALYSIS,
SENSITIVE APPL IL ATION
EVALUATION/CERTIFICATION AND
RISK MANAGEMENT PLANS
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Additional data for design, development, or procurement
planning nay be required and will be discussed below. the nest
step is to develop an outline of the IMP. The development of
RRPI, application:, and Center-level plans are discussed
separately below.
3.2 DPI Risk Nanagemenr Plans
The risk management plan for a data processing installation
most be integrated with, and considered a part of, the DPI's
computer security program. It should draw upon risk analysis
documentation and not be a complete or substantial
redocumentation of the risk analysis. Rather, the W should
summarize the findings of the risk analysis and provide a road
nap for achieving a security posture in which risks are
properly managed.
3.2.1 Risk Management Plan Framework
The risk manegement plan should be initially constructed in
outline form s Lunar to the sample provided in Appendix A. The
major (tens should include: a description of the risk
environment, risk categorization, risk occurrence evaluation,
risk occurrence impact, risk reduction decisions, and risk
reduction action plans.
3.2.2 Data Collection
The primary source of data L,-)r the risk environment, risk
categorization, risk occurrence evaluation, and the risk
occurrence impact is the risk analysis report and associated
work papers. Additional sources of data for documenting the
risk environment and risk categorization are the reports and
3-S
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the supporting work papers of any internal audits, Inspector
General reports, or management review. ♦ list of personnel
who were interviewed daring the risk analysis and the names of
management or operating staff who received briefings daring the
risk analysis should be compiled for use by the Off
developers. The NO developers should also identify logistics
sad procurement personnel who can provide data and assistance
for any controls that may involve procurement activities.
In the following discussions, references will be made to forms
and worksbeets utilised la the DASA Self-A alysis Guidance
Document (SAGOD) for ADP Risk Analysis. Vbere appropriate, 	 {
relevant form or documentation from other methodologies should 	 {
be utilised in developing Ws.	 s
1
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3.2.3 Risk Environment
This section of the DPI risk management plan should provide a
physical, organizational, and operational description of the
data processing installation.
1. The physical description of the DPI should, at a
w:inimun, include the following:
a. Building number or name
b. Physical location on the Center (street address or
street boundaries)
c. Brief description of the strest.ire
d. Loom locations o°. zonputer tardware and peripherals
e. Number and locattru of primary and emergency exits
f. Location of user service areas or other public
areas
3-6
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floor plan for each floor shoring computer
resource locations to include communications and
major electrica' - ,tpport equipment
b. Description and location of physical security
controls including guard stations, access control,
alarms, and fire protectioo/suppression equipment
1. storage areas for combustible supplies and media
vaults
J. Descriptioa of supporting utilities (e.g., power,
air conditioning, ere.)
The above information may be obtained from Appeadior A
of the SAWD risk analysis report. The primary forms
will be the Data Collection Form and floor plans
Included or appended to the report.
2. The organizational description should include the
following:
a. Copy of On mission statement
b. DFI functional organization chart with brief
description of the units for both the NASA
organization and facilities management contractor
where appropriate
e. Rey personnel telephone list
Organizational description data should be availcble
from the risk analysis work papers and the Data Source
Form found in Appendix a of the SAG= risk analysis
report.
3. The operational description should include the
following:
a. Listing of physical assets (e.g., computer
hardware, peripherals, terminals. etc.)
b. Hardware configuration chart
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c. Listing of vendor maintenance points &I contact
d. Communications soematles
e. List of sensiti--e applications processed at DPI
f. Description of procedural and technical DPX controls
(e.g., computer access controlled by a software
security package that provides password protection
to file level. etc.)
Operational description data should be found in Appendix 5 on
the Asset Inventory Fora.
If the above required data is not available from the SAM risk
analysis report and attendant work papers, refer to Volc= 1 of
the Self Analysis Guidance Document. specifically Task 1, Step
3 .and Task 2. Steps 1-8. Existing safeguards or controls are
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 of the SAGUD. Existing safe- 	 i
guards nay also be found in the responses to the vulnerability
questionnaire.
r
3.2.4 Risk Categorization
This section of the DPI risk management plan should identify
the threats that any adversely impact the equipment,
facilities, personnel, data, and supplier. Threats should be
documented without reference to existing safeguards or controls
designed to mitigate threats. The objective in documenting
threats at this point in the plan is simply to provide an
identification and to develop an understanding of the threats 	 f
to the equipment, facilities, personnel, supplies, and data.
The potential impact or consequences of any threat acting
against the DPI will be documented In the risk occurrence
Impact section of the AMP.
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Suggested ways of documenting th:tats include the following:
e Categorization by natural disasters, disasters of human
origin, access problems, and system reliability hazards
as discussed in IM 2410, Appendix 3, Section 503
e Threats by loss category; i.e., damage. denial of
possession, denial of use and disclosure per SAGUD
Volume II, Appendix C3, or as codified in Appendix C2
e Listing of threat definitions/scenarios as provided in
Appendix 6 of this document
Threat data may be obtained from the Threat Asset Analysis
Matrix form in Appendix E of the SACUD risk analysis report.
3.2.5 Risk Occurrence Evaluation
Each threat should be evaluated with respect to its likelihood
of occurrence. The nature of each threat sill, in large part,
determine the potential frequency of occurrence. In the case
of natural disasters, geography, time of year, atmospheric
patterns, etc., are major factors in estimating likelihood. In
dealing with threats of human origin, likelihood of occurrence
will be based, to a significant degree, on the reliability,
Integrity, and competency of personnel. The other major
parameter affecting likelihood of occurrence will be the
vulnerabilities of the DPI. Vulnerabilities may exist as a
result of operational procedures, ineffective controls, or lack
of controls. This section of the R? should identify the
threats, the vulnerabilities which would permit the threats to
materialize, a statement of likelihood of occurrence, and an
Identification of existing controls assigned to reduce the
occurrence rate. In those cases where likelihood of occurrence
is based primarily on judgmental estimates rather than
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empirical evidence, the rationale for the estimate should be
documented.
The primary sources of data for this section of the MP are the
Threat Asset Analysis Katrix. the Threat Asset Summary Pore.
and the Vulnerability Findings form from Appendix s of the
SAGUD risk analysis report.
3.2.6 Risk occurrence Impacts
The impact or consequences for each threat should be assessed.
The impact is usually stated in monetary (dollar) terms and is
determined by multiplying the single or one-time loss of an
asset by the frequency of occurrence of each threat that may
adversely affect the asset. Single-time loss for dAmage,
denial of possession. denial of use and disclosure are usually	 !
determined separately. This section of the DPI risk management
plan should identify each asset. the • threats that may impact
the asset, the vulnerabilities that would permit each threat to
materialize, the annual frequency estimates for each threat. the
single time loss, and the annual loss exposure. In those
instancep where thi okeer of magnitude concepts were wad Niue
to difficulty in determining dollar values, a narrative
description of the threat occurrence impact should be included.
The primary sources of data for this section of the RMP are the
ALE Worksheets from Appendix 3 of the SAGUD risk analysis
report.
3.2.7 Risk Reduction Decisions
The previous sections of the DPI risk management plan have
involved extracting and/or summarizing data previously
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documented in the risk analysis report. The development of
tbas : ,iction of the report is based on management'e response to
the risks identified and analyzed in the risk analysis and the
control recommendations resulting from the risk reduction
analysis.
Each risk should be identified, the impact of risk occurrence
on the organizational mission should be described, and the
acceptability or nonacceptability of the risk should be
Indicated. For unacceptable risks, the controls currently in
place as well as those approved by management for later
Implementation should be noted.
3.2.8 Risk Reduction Action Plans
Management's decisions should be turned into a not of action
plans for implementing the needed controls. The data for the
action plans should be contained in or attached to the decision
paper originally provided to management. The action plans
should provide detailed activities for the design, development,
procurement, testing, and implementation of controls. At a
minimum, it is recommended that a CAM chart be developed
Indicating elapsed time to implmentation, with subtask
schedules included. Project documents should permit the
tracking of subtasks as well as resource expenditures. A
sample risk reduction action plan for developing a contingency
play is shown in Figure 3-2.
3.3 Sensitive Application Risk Management Plans
The risk management plan for a sensitive application draws upon
the data gathered and the ao • lytical results documented during
3-1L
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the evaluation/certification process. As in the case of a DPI
IMP, the sensitive application RMP should, where possible,
•ummarize the findings of the evaluation. The sensitive
application UP should psovid- a roadmap for achieving an
unqualified certification of each sensitive application.
3.3.1 Risk Management Plan Framework
The risk management plan should be initially constructed in
outline form similar to the outline sasple shown in
Appendix B. ibe major items to be included are: the
application risk environment, risk categories, risk occurrence
evaluation, risk occurrence impact, risk reduction decisions,
and risk reduction action plans.
3.3.2 Data Collection
The primary source of data for the risk environment, risk
categorization, risk occurrence evaluation, and the risk
occurrence impact is the application evaluation report.
Additional data may be gathered from system documentation,
Audit and IG reports, and management reviews. Lists should be
compiled of the personnel who were interviewed during the
evaluation and also of the personnel who participated In the
threat scenario analysis sessions. The risk management plan
developer should identify the procurement personnel who are
responsible for acquisition of ADP software and services.
In the following sections, references will be made to
activities and forme utilized in the evaluation of existing
censitive applications, as described in "Guidelines for
Certification of Existing Sensitive Applications" (MTR-
820018),. Relevant forms or documentation from other
r
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methodologies should be substituted in the development of RMPs
as appropriate.
3.3.3 Risk Environment
This section of the sensitive application risk management plan
should provide a general description of tha application, the
data, the security concerns, and the existing controls. 4-he
general description of the application should be available from
Section 2 of the Evaluation Report. The general description of
the application should, at a minimum, include the following:
• A functional overview of the application
• List of major users, data ova.ers and data custodians,
and the application CSO
• A description of the DPI that processes the application
• A description of the mode(s) of execution (i.e., batch.
on-line, update, remote job entry, etc.)
iac::•ific:ation of software package vendor (if
appropriate) and a description of maintenance procedures
•_ A description of the sensitive or critical attributes
of the application
• The type of data processed and generated by the
application
• Description of any sensitive or critical processing
algorithms
• List of other applications that utilize or require data
from this application
The description of the security attributes should include the
following:
• The data and system security objectives
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• The security requirements and specifications
• Any existing security controls, including physical and
technical safeguards and admiaistrative procedures
3.3.4 Risk Categorization
This section of the sensitive application risk management plan
should identify the threats that may adversely impact the
Integrity, confidentiality, ur availability of the application
and its associated data. Threats should be documented without
regard to any existing or planned safeguards. The objective is
simply to identify those events, uituations, or personnel (by
position) that have the capability to impact adversely the
functions and data supported by the application. The potential
:.pacts or consequences of any threat or threats acting against
the application system as well as the effectiveness of any
vxisting controls in mitigating these threats will be
documented in the risk occurrence evaluation and impact
sections of the RNP. The data for this section of the RMP
should be extracted from the threat scenario analysis worksheet.
Suggested ways of documenting threats include:
• Categorization by threats to the application software
(e.g., software development and maiatenance, threats
during program execution)
• Categorization of threats to data (e.g., during data
preparation or entry, data base maintenance)
• Categorization of threats to output products (e.g.,
during distribution, storage or destruction operations)
3-15
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s Listing of threats by security objective; i.e,
integtity, confidentiality, availability, and
deliberate or unin;entional acts)
e Categorization by threats to security requirements
3.3.5 Risk Occurrence Evaluation
This section should document the likelihood that each threat or
threat scenario will occur. Each threat or threat scenario
should be Hated, together with the vulnerabilities that wo"Id
permit an attack to be mounted against the system, and i,
description of the controls that are in place to prevent or
limit loss. The likelihood of threat occurrence should then be,
stated in high, medium, or low terms with an accompanying
description of the rationale for this evaluation.
The primary source of data for this section of the report are
the Threat Au-%lysis Worksheets.
3.3.' Risk Occurrence InEacte
This section of the report should state the monetary impact of
a successful attack against the application and/or data. Where
it is not possible or feasible to .quantify the impact, a
qualitative statement or narrative description of the
consequences of a successful attack against the duplication and
the associated data should be provided.
The primary source of data for this section of the W are the
Threat Analysis Worksheets.
i
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3.3.1 Risk Reduction Decision
The previous sections of the sensitive application risk
management plan have involved the extraction and summarisation
of data from the sensitive application evaluation repot. This
section will be based upon the certification report provided to
and the certification do^ision made by the application C)0. In
this section of the RHP, each risk should he identifier, the
Impact or consequences on the organizational missions should be
described. and !! =:tzt::,a should identify each risk as
accepto"le or not acceptable. For unacceptable riska, the
eoatrols currently in place as yell as those approved b7
management for implementation shoull be noted.
3.3.d Risk Reduction Action Plans
The successful implementation of additional safeguards for an
existing application requires the development of one or more
plans to provide control over design, development, procurement,
and testing activities. The expenditure of dollar ar:d
personnel resources should also be monitored The data for the
action plans should be contained in the supporting documents
for the deci!iion }viper submitted, as appropkiate, to the
application CM or upper zAnagment. At a minimum, a simple
GA.'4TT chart should
	 prepared. This chart should indicate
elapsed time for implementation and provide subtask echedules.
A sample risk reduction action plan form is provided in
Appendix F. (See Figure 3-2 for a completed example.)
3.4 NASA Center-Level Risk Management Plans
Center computer security officials should develop risk
management plans that summarize ADP security risks across the
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entire Ceul.vr. The primary objective of the Center-level risk
management plan is to provide a management control process over
DPI and sensitive application risk management plans. A
secondary objective of the Center risk management plan is to
provide the Center CSO with a mechanism to monitor the DPI and
sensitive application risk management activities.
3.4.1 Risk Management Plan Framework
The Center-level risk management plan should be started in
outline form similar to the sample provided in Appendix C. The
major items in the outline should include: a description of
the risk environment, risk categorisation, risk occurrence
evaluation, risk occurrence consequences, risk reduction
decisions, and risk reduction action plans. It is recommended
that separate subsections be established for DPI's and
applications within each major section:	 i
3.4.2 Data Collection
The primary sources of data for the Center risk management plan
are the DPI and sensitive application risk management pans.
The Center computer security official should also have access
to Cente:-wide audits, IG reports, and management review..
3.4.3 Risk Environment
Thia section of the Center risk management plan should provide i
physical, organizational, and operational description of the 	
4
Center's data processing environment. The physical description 	 1
i
of the Center should include:
{
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• Description of geographical location of the Center to
include major metropolitan area(*) surro.inding the
Center
• Description of primary and secondary sources of
electric posmer. telephone and other communications
service, beating and cooling
• Physical location of utility distribution potato at the
Center
The organisational description of the Center should include the
following:
• A Center mission statement
m A summary of the major type of activities conducted at
the Center
• A functional organization chart that identifies major
directorates at the Center
• A telephone listing of -ey management and operational
personnel who have ADP and security responsibilities
and also a telephone listing of DPI and sensitive
applica-tion CSOs.
The operational description should include the following:
• Description of the open or closed nature of the Center
(e.g.. Center Is open to visitors through Gate 1 during
daylight hours with restrlctt-d access during hours of
darkness)
s General description of Center security program such as
the physical security procedures for employees, badge
requirements. perimeter controls. etc.
3.4.3.1 Data Processing Installations
This portion of the risk environment section should Incl •.ide the
following for each DPI:
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t• The location
• The primary functional uses (e.a., institutional data
processing. mission control, etc.)
• ♦ functional organization chart which identifies DPI
msmagers
• The name and phos_e number of the DPI CSOs
• The date anu major findings of the last DPI risk
analysis
3.4.3.2 Sensitive Applications
This portion of the risk environment section should identify
the sensitive applications processed at the Center. For each 	 i
sensitive application the following items should be documented:
• The overall functional purpose of the application
	 i
• The DPI at which the application is processed
• The mode of execution (i.e., batch, on-line query.
remote job entry)
• The type of data processed
• The name and telephone number of the application CSO
and data owner
• The date of last evaluation and any qualification
contained in the certification statement
3.4.4 Risk Categorization
This section of the Center risk management plan should identify
the threats that may adversely affect Center-wide ADP
operations. Threats should be listed in this section without
regard to any existing or planned safeguards. For suggested
bays of categorizing or listing threats refer to Sections 3.2.4
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and 3.3.6 of this document. This section should be a
summarization of the DPI and sensitive application .Ask
categorization sections.
3.6.5 Risk Occurrence Evaluation
Each Center-wide threat should be evaluated watt, re: At , to
likelihood of occurrence. This section of the Center risk
manageaeat plan should identify each threat. the
vulnerabilities that slight permit the threat to materialise,
the controls or safeguards designed to reduce the likelihood of
occurrence, and a statesient indicating likelihood of
occurrence. In those instances where likelihood of occurrence
Is primarily based on judgwental estimates rather than
empirical evidence, the rationale for the estimate should be
documented. Again, this section should be built on
corresponding section in the DPI and sensitive application
We.
3.6.6 Risk Occurrence Impacts
The impact or consequences for each threat should be assessed.
The impact should be stated in dollar terms. Consequences
should be stated in qualitative terms. At the Center-level,
goat impacts to Center-vide ADP operations should be described
In terms of consequences. Detailed statements of !apact are
not recommended for the Center-level risk management because
the impact on each DPI or application will be contained in
individual DPI and application MP's which should be available
to the Center CSO.
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3.4.7 Risk Reduction Decisions
?his section of Center-level risk management plan should
sus rise the management's ADP security program decisions. It
should indicate the guidance that management has provided for
reducing ADP security risks at the Center- level. For example.
a Center manages& _ decision to have all DPIs conduct an
Initial risk analysis within the neat two years would be
Included in this section of a Center RKP.
3.4.8 Risk Reduction Action Plans
Management's decisions concerning Center-wide ADP security
risks should be turned into a set of action plans. Each action
plan should identify the major task and subtasks, the estimated
and elapsed time to completion, the responsible person, and the
estimated and actual resource expenditures. It is suggested
that a CAM chart be developed similar to the example in
Figure 3-2.
3.5 Integration of DPI and Sensitive Application Risk
Mrnagement Plane
In some NASA environments, it may be desirable to integrate the
DPI and sensitive application risk management plans into a
single document. This would apply in a case where a single
sensitive application is the only application processed on a
stand-alone micro or mini computer. Integration of plans may
also be appropriate where ADP security risk management
responsibilities for both the DPI and a sensitive application
are assigned to a single computer security official.
Separation of DPI and sensitive application specific data
should be maintained in the P_4P sections addressing the risk
environment, risk categorization, risk occurrence evaluation,
Ti
I
1
t
t
1
i
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and risk occurrence impact. However, integration of the risk
reduction action plans is appropriate where one individual is
responsible for managing the risks associated with both the DPI
and the sensitive application.
3.6 Coordination of DPI and Sensitive Application
Risk Management Plans
Although the above guidance has made a distinction between DPI
and sensitive application risk management plans, it is obvious
that computer facilities and applications are interdependent.
It is. therefore, important to maintain close liaison between
the personnel who develop and maintain DPI and sensitive
application risk managment plans. Coordination of rig's.
reduction action plans is of special concern where the measures
ret:.sired to reduce the risks in an application system are
dependent upon technical features inherent to the computer
hardware or the operating system software.
3.7 Sensitivity of Risk Management Plans
Risk managment plans, like risk analysis reports, provide a
consolidated statement of the security posture of a data
processing installation or a sensitive application. The
information contained in the RMP is extremely valuable to
personnel whose interests and objectives are inimical to those
of NASA. Therefore, the number of copies of risk management
plans and any associated work papers should be limited. The
distribution of copies should be tightly controlled. Copies
should not be left on shelves or desk tops unattended.
i
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4. RISC MANAGEMENT PLAN MAINTENANCE
The maintenance of risk management plans should be focused on
three major area&:
1. Monitoring of risk reduction action plans to ensure
that the design, development, procurement and
Implementation of controls proceed according to
schedule and within budget
2. Auditing of implemented controls to determine their
effectiveness
3. Reviewing physical, organisational and operational
activities to identify changes that might necessitate
re-evaluation or modification of current risk
reduction measures
4.1 Monitoring of Risk Reduction Action Planr
The actions preceding the implementation of some controls may
closely parallel a system acquisition life cycle. For example,
procurement and installation of an access control softvare
package may involve several months of procurement activities,
several months of developing access rules or matrices,
training, testing, and phased implementation. Some controls,
such as an ADP contingency plan for a major computer facility,
will require as such as six months to a year for the
development phase. Therefore, risk reduction action plans must
be continually monitored to ensure that schedules are adhered
to as closely as possible and that deviations from the schedule
are reasonable and approved by management. It is also
Important to ensure that management is periodically informed on
the progress of the action items. Normal project control
procedures should be used for monitoring risk reduction action
plans.
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4.2 Audit of Implemented Controls
The primary purpose of auditing implemented controls is to
determine their effectiveness. It should be remembered that if
a control is totally effective, the specific risk being
protected probably will not materialize. Similarly, if the
vulnerability being mitigated by control has not been
exploited, the risk say not materialize. Controls must be
audited to ensure that they operate as designed. Controls
should be periodically tested. Documented procedures for using
the control should be reviewed to ensure that they are 'being
followed. As part of an effectivess audit, controls should be
evaluated to determine if the control has created a sore
serious vulnerability or risk than it was designed ro reduce.
4.3 Reviewing Physical, Organizational and Operational
Activities
A risk management plan is a management tool that must be able
to respond to changes in the physical, organizational, and
operational environment. Changes to physical facilities, the
introduction of a new computer system, implementation of new
systems, and promulgation of new regulations may affect the
risk environment. New risks may appear and some risks may
disappear, thus negating the requirement for some controls or
establishing a requirement to modify existing controls.
Organizational changes may result in changes of responsibility
for control implementation and maintenance activities.
Additionally, control technulogy is constantly advancing which
may reduce the cost of controls which were not previously
considered to be cost-effective.
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All of the foregoing changes should be monitored by risk
management plan developers. In those instances where a change
Is considered significant. modifying current controls should be
evaluated against the need to update the most recent DPI risk
analysis or sensitive application evaluation. Furthermore, the
development and implementation of risk management principles,
techniques, and tools in the data processing environment will
be a new experience for way NASA personnel. As experience is
gained, progressive interaction nf r':. management plans and of
these guidelines will be required.
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APPENDIX A
OUTLINE FOR
DPI RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Background
2. RISK ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Physical Description
2.2 Organization Description
2.3 Operational Description
3. RISK CATEGORIZATION
3.1 Damage Threats
3.2 Denial of Possession Threats
3.3 Denial of Use Threats
3.4 Disclosure Threats
4. RISK OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
4.1 Damage Threats
4.2 Denial of Possession Threats
4.3 Denial of Use Threats
4.4 Disclosure Threats
5. RISK OCCURRENCY IMPACTS
5.1 Impact!Consequences of Damage Threats
5.2 Impact/Consequences of Denial of Possession Threats
5.3 Impact/Consequences of Denial of Use Threats
5.4 Imp::t/Consequences of Disclosure Threats
6. RISK Ri ^TION DECISIONS
6.1 Acceptable Risks
6.2 Unacceptable Risks
7. RISK REDUCTION ACTION PLANS
7.1 Project Plan for Risk Reduction Action Item 1
7.2 Project Plan for Risk Reduction Action Item 2
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APPENDIX B
OUTLINE FOR
SENSITIVE APPLICATION AiSK MANAGEMENT PLA:i
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Background
2. RISK ENVIRONMENT
2.1 General Description
2.1.1 Functional Overview
2.1.2 Users, Owners. Custodians, CSO
2.1.3 Description of Hardware Support
2.1.4 Type of Data Processed
2.1.5 Sensitive/Critical Attributes
2.1.6 Sensitive/Critical Algorithms
2.1.7 Associated Application Systems
2.2 Security Attributes
2.2.1 Data and System Security Objectives
2.2.2 Security Requirements
2.2.3 Security Specifications
2.2.4 4xistiug Controls
3. RISK CATEGORIZATION
3.1 Integrity Threats
3.2 Confidentiality Threats
3.3 Availability Threats
3.4 Fraud Threats
4. RISK OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
4.1 Integrity Threats
4.2 Confidentiality Threats
4.3 Availability Threats
4.4 Fraud Threats
5. RISK OCCURRENCE IMPACTS
5.1 Impact/Consequences of Integrity Threats
5.2 Impact/Consequences of Confidentiality Threats
5.3 Impact/Consequences of Availability Threats
5.4 Impact/Consequences of Fraud Threats
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6. RISK REDUCTION DECISIONS
6.1 Acc-:ptable Risks
6.2 Unacceptable Risks
7. RISK MUCTION ACTION PLANS
7.1 Risk Reduction Action Item 1
7.2 Rick Reduction Action Item 2
7.3 Risk Reduction Action Item 3
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APPENDIX C
OUTLINE FOR
NASA CENT°R
RISK MANAGMMT PLAN
1, INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Background
2. RISK ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Physical Description of Center
2.2 Organizational Description of Center
2.3 Operational Description of Center
2.4 Data Processing Installations
2.4.1 DPI Locations
2.4.2 DPI Functions
2.4.3 DPI Orgnization
2.4.4 DPI CSO
2.4.5 Date and Major Findings of Last DPI Risk Aaalysis
2.5 Sensitive Applications
2.5.1 Functional Overview of Applications
2.5.2 Supporting DPI
2.5.3 Type of Data Processed
2.5.4 Application CSO and Data Owner
2.5.5 Date of Last Evaluation and Qualifications to
Certificztion
3. RISK CATEGORIZATION
3.1 Threats to Data Processing Installations
3.1.1 Damage Threats
3.1.2 Denial of Possession Threats
3.1.3 Denial of Use Threats
3.1.4 Disclosure Threats
3.2 Threats to Sensitive Applications
3.2.1 Integrity Threats
3.2.2 Confidentiality Threats
3.2.3 Availability Threats
3.1.4 Fraud Threats
I
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14. RIS:: OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
4.1 Threats to Data Processing Installations
4.1.1 Damage Threats
4.1.2 Denial of Possession Threats
4.1.3 Denial of Use Threats
4.1.4 Disclosure Threats
4.2 Threats to Sensitive Applications
4.2.1 Integrity Threats
4.2.2 Confidentiality Threats
4.2.3 Availability Threats
4.2.4 Fraud Threats
5. RISK OCCURRENCE CONSEQUENCES
5.1 Threats to Data Poocessing installations
5.1.1 Consequences of Damage Threats
5.1.2 Consequences of Denial of Possession Threats
5.1.3 Consequences of Denial of Use Threats
5.1.4 Consequences of Disclosure Threats.
5.2 Threats to Security
5.2.1 Consequences of Integrity Threats
5.2.2 Consequences of Confidentiality Threats
5.2.3 Consequences of Availability Threats
5.2,4 Consequences of Fraud Threats
6. RISK REDUCTION DECISIONS
6.1 Acceptable Risks
6.2 Unacceptable Risks
7. RISK REDUCTION ACTION PLANS
7.1 Risk Reduction Action Item 1
7.2 Risk Reduction Action Item 2
7.3 Risk Reduction Action Item 3
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